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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1778 (2007), by which the Council requested me to report to it every three months on the security and humanitarian situation in eastern Chad, the north-eastern Central African Republic and the region, including movements of refugees and internally displaced persons and progress made in creating security conditions conducive to their voluntary return. The report covers major developments since my report of 1 April 2008 (S/2008/215), including the deployment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the European Union-led military force (EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic) and the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS).

II. Update on recent developments

A. Political developments

2. The efforts to promote dialogue between the Government and opposition groups yielded mixed results during the reporting period. While the dialogue between the Government and the political parties has been revived within the framework of the 13 August 2007 agreement, no progress has been made towards the opening of similar dialogue with the Chadian Armed Opposition Group (CAOG). Although CAOG has been calling for dialogue, it continues to pursue the military option as indicated in section B below. At a meeting held on 25 March with majority leaders of the political parties, President Idriss Deby Itno reiterated his commitment to the full implementation of the 13 August 2007 agreement on the reinforcement of the democratic process in Chad. In a communiqué issued on the same day, the President reaffirmed his commitment to dialogue with political parties and civil society and called for opposition parties to resume their participation in the Monitoring and Support Committee established to facilitate the implementation of the 13 August 2007 agreement. President Deby also requested the National Commission of Inquiry, established on 2 April to look into the events of early February 2008, to begin work immediately.

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3. On 28 March, however, members of the opposition coalition, the Coordination des partis politiques pour la défense de la Constitution (CPDC), issued a statement expressing doubts about the President's intention to initiate an inclusive political dialogue. CPDC also called for the immediate "release" of its spokesperson, and leader of the Parti pour les libertés et le développement, Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, whose whereabouts remain unknown.

4. The Rassemblement des forces pour le changement (RFC), headed by Timane Erdimi, reportedly split into two groups during the reporting period. One faction has entered into negotiations with the Government, while the other joined the Alliance Nationale, a new coalition of Chadian armed opposition groups led by the leader of the Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement, Mahamat Nouri. On 25 March, a small group of armed elements from RFC travelled to N'Djamena and surrendered their weapons to the Government, while the Union des forces pour le changement et la démocratie announced its integration into the armed Alliance Nationale. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya announced the opening of inter-Chadian peace negotiations in Tripoli on 14 April between the Government of Chad and RFC.

5. On 15 April, President Deby appointed as Prime Minister Youssouf Saleh Abbas, who until then had been the President's Special Representative for MINURCAT and EUFOR and head of the Coordination nationale d'appui à la force internationale (CONAFIT). President Deby subsequently signed a presidential decree designating the new Government, including four former political opponents appointed as the Ministers of Justice, Defence, Agriculture and Territorial Administration. These positive steps towards a broad-based Government enjoyed considerable national support.

6. In his first speech before the National Assembly on 6 May, Prime Minister Saleh Abbas outlined his Government's programme, including the implementation of the 13 August 2007 agreement. He also announced that Government emissaries had entered into direct negotiations with Chadian armed opposition groups to bring those groups back into the framework of the peace agreement signed on 25 October 2007 in Sirte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, between the Government and the main Chadian armed opposition groups. It will be recalled that under the Sirte accord, the Government and the armed opposition groups undertook to respect the Constitution, cease fighting, grant amnesty to the rebels, allow rebel groups to participate in the running of State affairs and integrate rebel forces into the Chadian national army.

7. On 10 April, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, in consultation with the leader of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Muammar Al-Qadhafi and the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, convened in Libreville the first meeting of the contact group established to monitor the implementation of the Dakar accord between Chad and the Sudan. Members of the contact group, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Congo, Senegal, Gabon, Eritrea, Chad, the Sudan, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union met at the ministerial level to consider the possibility of deploying observers and organizing joint patrols to monitor the border between Chad and the Sudan. Participants also urged Presidents Deby of Chad and Al-Bashir of the Sudan to peacefully settle tensions between their countries. The contact group decided to meet on a monthly basis to ensure follow-up to the implementation of the Dakar accord.

8. Within the context of ongoing regional political initiatives, and at the invitation of the Minister for African Affairs of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Ali Triki, my Special Representative for the Central African Republic and Chad travelled to Tripoli on 23 and 24 April, to brief Libyan authorities on the MINURCAT mandate and to gain a better understanding of Tripoli's views on the implementation of the Dakar accord.

9. In the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic, the situation continues to be calm. Despite recent power struggles within the political leadership of the Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR), the movement continues to respect the ceasefire provisions of the April 2007 Birao peace agreement. A comprehensive peace agreement, including provisions for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Central African Republic rebel groups, was signed between the Government and UFDR and the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy on 21 June in Libreville. The Democratic Front of the Central African People, which participated in the preliminary meetings, did not sign the agreement because its leader, Abdoulaye Miskine, did not authorize the negotiators to do so on behalf of the movement. This agreement will be an integral part of the upcoming inclusive political dialogue, a reconciliatory process aimed at addressing the country's political and security crises. An international committee comprised of other central African States and the European Union will monitor the agreement.

B. Security situation

10. The security situation in the border areas of Chad and the Central African Republic with Darfur remains fragile and unpredictable. The relations between Chad and the Sudan showed no concrete signs of improvement, despite the signing of the 13 March Dakar accord. On 14 March, one day after signing the accord, the Government of Chad told MINURCAT that several columns of heavily armed rebels had crossed from the Sudan into Chadian territory at Moudeina, 60 kilometres south-east of Adé. On the same day, some 25 to 45 vehicles with armed rebels were seen by United Nations personnel in Choukouyane, about 140 kilometres south-east of Abéché. The Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT) subsequently redeployed near Adré, located 150 kilometres south-east of Abéché. On 1 April, FANT engaged rebels affiliated with the Alliance Nationale in a four-hour battle near Adé, located at the border with the Sudan some 160 kilometres south-east of Abéché. The rebels were repelled and reportedly withdrew towards the Sudanese border.

11. On 27 March, the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/212), alleging that Chad had violated the Dakar accord and previous agreements by sponsoring a meeting of Darfur rebel groups on 22 and 24 March in the Abu Nabaq area, with the participation of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). On 1 April, the Permanent Representative of Chad addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/222), alleging that Chad had been attacked by Sudanese-backed armed groups in Adé, in violation of the 13 March Dakar accord.

12. On 1 April, I issued a statement expressing concern over the continued movements of rebel groups across the Chad-Sudan border and calling upon the Governments of Chad and the Sudan to uphold their commitments under the

13 March Dakar accord and to make every effort to ensure that rebel groups do not use their territory as a staging ground for incursions.

13. The attacks by JEM rebels against Khartoum on 10 May further worsened the already tense relations between Chad and the Sudan. The momentum generated by the signing of the Dakar agreement faded as the Sudan accused Chad of masterminding the attacks, and the Sudan severed diplomatic ties with N'Djamena. On 11 May, the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/325) accusing Chad of having planned, financed and carried out the 10 May events. Chad denied any involvement.

14. On 12 May, members of the contact group, except the Sudan, met in Tripoli for its second ministerial meeting. The contact group condemned the 10 May attack against the Government of the Sudan and expressed solidarity with the people of that country. In an effort to prevent any escalation between Chad and the Sudan, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, visited N'Djamena and Khartoum to help defuse the tensions and facilitate the restoration of normal ties between the two countries. On 9 June, the third ministerial meeting of the contact group was held in Brazzaville, Congo with the participation of the representatives of Chad and the Sudan. The meeting reaffirmed the contact group's determination to help both countries restore relations through confidence-building, peace, friendship and "brotherliness".

15. On 11 June, following reports that Chadian rebel groups had crossed the border in Moudeina, FANT bombed suspected rebel groups. Fighting erupted between FANT and Chadian rebel groups around the Koukou Angarana and Goz Amer refugee camps on 12 June. The following day, Chadian rebel groups took control of Goz Beida before withdrawing to the outskirts of Abéché several hours later. During the brief occupation of Goz Beida, the rebel groups looted offices of aid agencies, including the premises of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and set ablaze a fuel depot. Aid workers sought refuge in the EUFOR camp during the attack. On 15 June, Chadian rebel groups took control of Am Dam, some 120 kilometres south of Abéché. The column subsequently withdrew some 40 kilometres south of Abéché. On 16 June, a third column of rebel groups took the town of Biltine, 90 kilometres north of Abéché. Although the rebel groups had announced that their ultimate objective was to attack N'Djamena, they started retreating eastwards towards the Chad-Sudan border on 17 June. The groups attacked several towns including Biltine and Am Zoer during the retreat. On 17 June, the Government of Chad reported that Sudanese army helicopters had attacked the town of Adé, a charge which was denied by the Government of the Sudan.

16. On 2 April, in the north-western Central African Republic, the Multinational Force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community inaugurated a new military base. Together with the expected arrival of a 120-strong Cameroonian contingent, this should improve the security situation in the area and allow State authorities to extend their presence in this volatile region.

C. Humanitarian situation

17. The 180,000 internally displaced persons and 250,000 refugees in eastern Chad continue to be gravely affected by ongoing internal and cross-border hostilities. The civilian character of refugee camps and internally displaced persons sites continues to be compromised by the presence of armed elements in and around the camps. During the reporting period, some 6,000 newly arrived refugees from Darfur were relocated from the border areas to the Kounoungo and Mile refugee camps some 200 kilometres north-east of Abéché.

18. The fragile security climate continues to impede humanitarian operations and access. On 1 May, a three-car convoy, including United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, was stopped by two armed elements on the road from Farchana to Adré. The Director of Save the Children (United Kingdom) was asked to leave the car and to lie on the ground. He was later shot and killed. On 10 May, two gendarmes from the Commission Nationale d'Aide aux Réfugiés (CNAR), working with UNHCR, prevented a car belonging to a non-governmental organization from being hijacked. The following day, the two gendarmes were killed in Am Nabak. Chadian gendarmes under the CNAR and UNHCR arrangement continue to provide security for the refugees and internally displaced persons pending the deployment of DIS in eastern Chad. On 27 May, following the hijacking of humanitarian vehicles at gunpoint, Médecins Sans Frontières — Luxembourg, based in Iriba, decided to leave the country, leaving some 50,000 Sudanese refugees in Am Nabak, Touloum and Iridimi camps with reduced health-care services.

19. Although the conditions for the return of refugees to Darfur and the Central African Republic are yet to be created, small spontaneous return movements are being observed among internally displaced persons. Humanitarian agencies are starting to plan for the potential voluntary return of internally displaced persons to certain locations, especially around the Goz Beida area, once their security, basic needs and reconciliation can be addressed. On 17 May, the voluntary return of internally displaced persons was discussed at the first meeting of CONAFIT with EUFOR, MINURCAT, and the diplomatic and humanitarian communities. It was decided that there would be no return as long as all the necessary conditions were not in place.

20. A mid-year consolidated appeal review workshop was held in N'Djamena on 19 and 20 May. Of the $288 million needed, only 21 per cent has been funded to date. There is increasing concern that insufficient funding for humanitarian activities in Chad will have significant consequences for the vulnerable populations, including refugees, the displaced and host communities, who need assistance for their survival.

21. During her visit to Chad and the Central African Republic, from 25 to 31 May, my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, highlighted the plight of refugee and internally displaced children and urged all parties to prevent any further illegal recruitment of children into armed groups. She encouraged both Governments to address the issues of child trafficking and sexual violence against girls. As a result, the Chadian authorities have agreed to release over 60 children held in detention and to allow verification visits to military camps and military training institutes to prevent any further recruitment of minors.

III. Activities of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

22. As of 15 June, the strength of MINURCAT stood at 592, including 148 United Nations police officers and 26 military liaison officers. The Deputy Special Representative, Rima Salah, took up her duties in Chad on 9 May 2008. The Mission is currently deployed in N'Djamena, Abéché, Goz Beida, Facharna, Bangui and Birao.

A. Police

23. During the period under review, MINURCAT established a coordination mechanism with CONAFIT to develop a close strategic and operational relationship with the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS). The DPKO standing police capacity continues to provide the start-up capacity for the police component of MINURCAT.

24. To date, over 211 out of 300 authorized United Nations police officers have been recruited, of whom 175 have already been deployed to Chad, including five to Abéché, five to Bangui and one to Birao. The deployment of the remaining police officers has been delayed due to the Mission's limited capacity to accommodate personnel. It is envisaged that United Nations police will deploy to Farchana in July, Goz Beida in August-September and Guereda, Iriba and Bahai in October 2008.

25. In the Central African Republic, MINURCAT continued to work closely with the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (BONUCA) and the United Nations country team to support police sector reform activities and the restoration of State authority in the Vakaga region in the north-eastern part of the country. From 14 to 17 April, MINURCAT undertook a joint mission with the Government of the Central African Republic to Birao to assess the situation and develop a common response to the security challenges. Five United Nations police officers have deployed to Bangui where they are co-located with BONUCA, and one United Nations police officer joined the two military liaison officers already present in Birao, north-eastern Central African Republic, to assess the needs of the local police and provide them with initial support.

26. As mentioned in my previous report (S/2008/215), MINURCAT successfully completed the training of DIS trainers in January 2008. On 24 May, 77 selected DIS commanders completed their one-month training. Candidates for 220 DIS officer posts will be selected from the gendarmerie and national police by the end of June and trained immediately thereafter with a view to deploying DIS officers in eastern Chad by the end of July.

27. A number of challenges affect the full deployment of United Nations police and DIS officers, the greatest being the absence of infrastructure for office and living space, inadequate logistical support for the training facilities and delays in refurbishing of the National Police Academy. Limited ground and air transportation also represent a challenge in the face of the upcoming rainy season. Other issues have been the absence of a legal framework establishing DIS, which is linked to the delay in signing the memorandum of understanding between the Government of Chad and MINURCAT on DIS, and the delay in selecting the first batch of 220 police officers and gendarmes that will integrate with DIS.

B. Military liaison officers

28. During the period under review, MINURCAT deployed a total of 24 military liaison officers. While one officer is embedded in the EUFOR operational headquarters in Mont Valérien, France, six are based in Abéché, two in Farchana and two in Goz Beida. In the Central African Republic, one military liaison officer is deployed in Bangui and two in Birao. Additionally, 10 officers are based in N'Djamena, including those assigned to the joint operation centre and the joint military analysis cell.

29. MINURCAT military liaison officers and EUFOR are working together to strengthen their partnership and framework for cooperation. This includes intensified consultations and coordination on a regular basis as well as the sharing of information on security-related matters.

C. Rule of law

30. From 15 to 23 April, an inter-agency planning mission led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations visited Chad to assess the justice and corrections system in Chad as related to the mandated activities of MINURCAT. The mission included representatives of UNHCR, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the European Commission.

31. The team met with national authorities, civil society and international partners and visited justice and prison facilities in N'Djamena, Abéché and Goz Beida. Eastern Chad is marked by barely functioning justice institutions, with a lack of judges and prosecutors and serious gaps in court infrastructure. In addition, the team noted an almost complete absence of defence lawyers working in the east. While UNHCR currently supports a small Chadian mobile court operation providing some judicial coverage outside of Abéché, this coverage is minimal.

32. With respect to the prison system, there is no functioning prison in Goz Beida, and there are serious infrastructure and other constraints affecting the Abéché prison, including poor prison security. In addition, there is no dedicated cadre of prison officials and no female officers to guard female inmates. With the limited number of functioning prisons in the east, an unknown number of individuals are held in small detention cells run by police and military personnel.

33. With regard to arrests and detention-related activities of DIS, the team outlined a three-pronged approach including tracking of the cases of those detained or arrested by DIS, support for Chad's mobile court system and support to key prisons. In addition to technical assistance, this approach will require significant funding through the MINURCAT trust fund. As recommended, MINURCAT will coordinate relations between the United Nations and donors in the justice and corrections sectors in eastern Chad. Partners, including UNDP, OHCHR and UNHCR, have agreed to pursue a common, coherent strategy for assistance in this sector, based upon the findings of the planning team.

34. In May 2008, following the planning mission, MINURCAT undertook three joint assessment exercises with the Chadian prison authorities to consider cost-

effective ways to improve the prison infrastructure and the general prison conditions in some areas. A joint prison development committee, including national prison authorities and representatives of MINURCAT, UNDP and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), was subsequently established to address the overall needs of the prison system. Issues already discussed include the recruitment and training of 200 Chadians as a foundation for the establishment of a professional prison system. MINURCAT has developed four quick-impact projects to address needs in terms of general infrastructure, security, improved accommodation, sanitary facilities and health service delivery in the Abéché, Goz Beida and N'Djamena prisons.

D. Human rights

35. During the reporting period, human rights officers documented reports of armed attacks on civilians by men in civilian and military clothes in eastern Chad. In most cases, the perpetrators were not identified and therefore have not been brought to justice. Human rights officers also received reports of sexual and gender-based violence and other forms of violence against women, including rape, in and outside refugee camps and displaced persons sites and in several villages. Corroborated information from various sources, including United Nations agencies and civil society organizations, also confirmed that at least four girls, including one minor, were raped by nine FANT soldiers as they were on their way to Were village situated 20 kilometres east of Abéché. The victims' parents subsequently lodged a complaint which led the police to arrest the alleged perpetrators.

36. On 3 June, MINURCAT met with the Minister of Human Rights, Fatime Issa Ramadane, together with senior officials of the Ministry. The meeting focused on the main challenges in eastern Chad and how MINURCAT and the Ministry could work together to address them.

E. Gender

37. During the period under review, MINURCAT strengthened its collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs and the prison authorities. In collaboration with Chadian women's organizations and the Ministry of Social Affairs, MINURCAT has been able to advocate for the improvement of prison conditions for female inmates and support projects assisting the effective reintegration of females and juveniles into society.

38. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), MINURCAT has undertaken to promote gender mainstreaming in its activities, especially in the context of policing. Comprehensive training materials have been developed to help staff respond effectively to, investigate and prevent incidents of gender-based violence, especially in settings involving refugees and internally displaced persons. MINURCAT also developed a gender policy and strategy paper for the guidance of DIS and a set of policy and action guidelines to mainstream the intertwined strands of gender and community policing in recruitment, deployment, promotion, conduct and discipline and other human resources and operational aspects of DIS.

39. Bearing in mind the specificities of women and children, MINURCAT developed training modules on child rights and child militarization as well as a child

victim-witness protocol with a view to sensitizing United Nations police and DIS personnel on the specific conditions and needs of children in refugee camps and communities of internally displaced persons.

F. Support

40. MINURCAT has developed a three-phase plan to ensure timely deployment and respect for security conditions in the east. The strategy is to maximize the usage of logistics materials deployed from the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, locally available resources and support available from EUFOR in order to deploy up to one third of the mission in eastern Chad, under extremely austere conditions, until new contracts for camp construction, logistics and management can be completed.

41. Phase 1 of the plan, which began on 1 April, involves the deployment of 110 personnel in existing structures in Abéché and tents within the EUFOR camps. This phase will be implemented in each location. Phase 2 involves the deployment of up to 250 staff in prefabricated buildings constructed by MINURCAT personnel in each location. It began in Abéché on 15 June and is due to be completed by 1 September in Iriba. This phase will also see the initial deployment of DIS officers to police facilities consisting of containerized offices and tents. Phase 3 involves the deployment of all remaining staff to eastern Chad and is predicated on the signing of a commercial camp construction contract by 1 July 2008, which would allow the deployment to be completed by 1 November 2008.

G. Staff safety and security

42. During the reporting period, as a result of an improvement in the security situation in Chad, the security phase in the capital and southern areas of the country was reduced from phase IV to phase III. In effect, this change applies to N'Djamena, Chari-Barguimi (Massenya), Guera (Mongo), Salamat (Am Timam), Logone Occidental (Moundou), Logone Oriental (Doba), Mandoul (Koumra), Mayo-Kebbi Est (Bongor), Mayo-Kebi Est (Pala), and Tandjile (Laï).

43. While the scaling down of the security phase is appropriate in the areas described above, the security phase in eastern Chad is recommended to remain at phase IV owing to the continued volatility in that part of the country.

IV. Deployment of the European Union-led military force

44. As of 19 June, EUFOR personnel deployed in Chad and the Central African Republic numbered 3,000, including some 200 in Birao, north-eastern Central African Republic. In addition, EUFOR has 200 personnel in its operational headquarters at Mont Valérien near Paris. EUFOR continues its deployment according to schedule. When fully deployed, the force will consist of some 3,700 troops.

45. EUFOR has established its military bases in Abéché, Goz Beida, Farchana, Iriba and Birao, where it provides MINURCAT with security, protection and limited logistics support, except for Iriba where MINURCAT has not yet deployed. In N'Djamena, the EUFOR rear force headquarters is also ready to support

MINURCAT with limited office accommodation until MINURCAT deploys its own infrastructure in the space provided.

46. From 7 to 11 April, Lieutenant General Patrick Nash, the EUFOR Operation Commander, visited Chad and the Central African Republic to monitor progress in the implementation of the force's mandate and meet with key partners in theatre. From 6 to 7 May, the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, visited the Central African Republic and Chad where he met with both President Bozizé and President Deby. The delegation also met with my Special Representatives, EUFOR and relevant actors working in Chad and the Central African Republic.

V. Financial implications

47. The General Assembly, by its resolution 62/233 of 22 December 2007, appropriated $182.4 million for MINURCAT for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008. As at 30 April 2008, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINURCAT amounted to $45.0 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $2,303.8 million.

VI. Observations

48. I am deeply concerned by the repeated cycles of rebel incursions into Chad and the continuing insecurity in the country. The fragile security climate has impeded humanitarian access, particularly since the killing of the Director of Save the Children on 1 May. I reiterate my condemnation of this criminal act and urge all parties to grant unrestricted access to humanitarian workers in eastern Chad.

49. Only a real political dialogue between the Government of Chad and the armed and non-armed opposition groups, as well as a mending of the relationship between Khartoum and N'Djamena can provide a lasting solution to the conflict in Chad. Once again, I urge the Governments of Chad and the Sudan to fully implement the 13 March Dakar agreement and take steps towards the normalization of their relations. The United Nations stands ready to work together with the African Union and other partners in supporting efforts to restore lasting peace and security along the Chad-Sudan border.

50. I am pleased with the level of cooperation extended by the Government of Chad to MINURCAT and EUFOR. However, it is important for the Government to expedite finalization of the legal framework for the deployment of the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS).

51. With the training of DIS trainees and commanders, MINURCAT has made a good start on its main task of enhancing the capacity of DIS to maintain law and order in the refugee camps and internally displaced persons locations. The Mission, the Government and EUFOR should now redouble their efforts to overcome the delays encountered in the next phase of the training of the DIS main body. In this regard, MINURCAT will explore the possibility of increasing the size of DIS classes and expediting the deployment of the United Nations police personnel. While the Government should accelerate submission of potential candidates, EUFOR could

consider greater flexibility in the accommodation space provided for MINURCAT personnel and in security arrangements for MINURCAT facilities.

52. EUFOR and MINURCAT are not in a position to directly address the problem of cross-border movement by armed groups. Furthermore, the mandates of MINURCAT and EUFOR limit the role of the two missions to addressing only the consequences and not the issues underlying the conflict in Chad. Unless these fundamental issues are addressed, and in the absence of a viable dialogue between the Government and all opposition groups, the resources invested by the international community in Chad risk being wasted. My report to the Security Council in September 2008 will examine these issues and provide recommendations on post-EUFOR arrangements.

53. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Victor Angelo, and the entire staff of MINURCAT, EUFOR, the United Nations country team and the humanitarian community for the commendable work they are doing in Chad and the Central African Republic.